Scholars have long sought to comprehend why established organizations have difficulty responding to discontinuous technological changes in their environments (for summaries, see Chesbrough, 2001; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008) . A major strand of research has particularly documented the tendency for incumbent firms to be timid in adopting discontinuous technologies, even those that appear to have demonstrable advantages over existing approaches, thus ceding strategic position to upstart firms that embrace these breakthroughs. This pattern has been observed in a wide array of sectors, including the cement (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) , disk drive (Christensen and Bower, 1996) , and photographic camera industries (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) .
More recently, researchers have shifted the focus away from viewing the inertia of incumbent firms as an inevitability, instead pursuing a different question: Among incumbent firms, which are most aggressive in adopting new, discontinuous technologies, and which are most passive? Recognizing that incumbent organizations vary in their responses to external trends and events, including the emergence of new technologies, scholars have begun to identify factors that might cause a given incumbent firm to defy the prevailing tendency and instead become an eager adopter of a discontinuous technology (Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997; Kaplan, 2008a) .
Among the factors considered, however, there has been little consideration of the distinctive role of business leaders in shaping companies' responses to discontinuous technologies. Given that it is relatively rare for incumbent firms to respond with aggressive commitments to discontinuous technologies, and that such commitments entail substantial resource reallocations that depart from the status quo, it is only reasonable to ask which chief executive officers (CEOs) do this. Although a few studies have examined how managerial attention to a new technology is a precursor to organizational adoption (Ocasio, 1997; Kaplan, 2008a; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009 ), scholars have not attempted to identify the qualities of those CEOs who are most attentive, or those who are most vigorous in committing resources, to discontinuous technologies.
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007 ) is a useful basis on which to expand our understanding of organizational responses to discontinuous technological change. According to upper echelons theory, executives interpret their situations through lenses formed by their individual attributes, including their experiences, values, and personalities; in turn, these highly personalized construals guide executives' actions. Because of their individual characteristics, executives vary in how they see a given set of stimuli, and they correspondingly vary in their responses. The vast majority of upper echelons studies have examined the effects of demographic attributes of executives (e.g., tenure, functional backgrounds, and education) on organizational outcomes, such as strategic change, structural choices, and performance (summarized in Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004) . Only recently have scholars begun to pay attention to the influence of more sophisticated conceptions of executive makeup, including CEO personality, on companies' strategies (Nadkarni and Herrman, 2010) .
One personality dimension that has been shown to influence CEOs' decisions is narcissism Hambrick, 2007, 2011) . Personality theorists have shown that narcissism is not just a clinical pathology, as originally conceptualized, but is also a personality dimension on which all individuals can be arrayed. Under this conception, narcissism is the degree to which an individual has an inflated sense of self and is preoccupied with having that self-view continuously reinforced (Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004) . In the organizational context, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) developed an unobtrusive index of narcissistic tendencies in CEOs, demonstrating that CEOs vary in their degrees of narcissism and that these differences are associated with the dynamism and grandiosity of company strategies.
There is ample reason to expect that a CEO's narcissism may provide the requisite force for overcoming inertia in the face of a technological shift. To the extent that a new technology carries considerable ambiguity, a narcissistic CEO's self-admiration will buoy the executive's conviction that he or she can succeed with the new direction, while a less narcissistic CEO will see the new technology as too risky. That is, narcissism shifts risk assessments (Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004) . Moreover, by taking bold or challenging actions, which tend to typify investments in discontinuous technologies, a narcissist can attract attention, which narcissists thrive on (e.g., Wallace and Baumeister, 2002) . As such, a highly narcissistic CEO will achieve a payoff-a nearly certain payoff-from visibly undertaking a risky course of action. This prompt payoff for the narcissistic CEO, in the form of audience enthrallment, is on top of any expected value of eventual returns from adopting the new technology. Therefore, our baseline hypothesis is that the more narcissistic a company's CEO, the more strategic initiatives with a discontinuous technology-including acquisitions, alliances, and launches of R&D projects associated with the new technology-the company will undertake.
In a major elaboration on this baseline expectation, we introduce the concept of ''audience engagement,'' or the degree to which observers view a phenomenon, such as a new technology, as noteworthy and provocative. Audience engagement can ebb and flow, in ways that affect the narcissist's motivation. For instance, one can readily envision that audience engagement might be lacking in the very earliest era of a new technology, as very few observers are aware of or can comprehend the new approach; at the other extreme, a new technology might eventually become seen as commonplace or prosaic and not particularly exciting. It is well known that narcissists crave audience attention (Kohut and Wolf, 1986) , but researchers of narcissism have yet to fully acknowledge that audiences are not perpetually assembled, nor perpetually alert to or intrigued by every type of undertaking (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001) . We highlight the importance of audience engagement, which can vary over time, as a critical moderator of the relationship between CEO narcissism and investment in a discontinuous technology.
We also examine the effect of CEO narcissism on managerial attention to discontinuous technologies, or the degree to which a firm's top managers (including the CEO) are collectively aware of and cognitively focused on such developments (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Cho and Hambrick, 2006) . CEOs' narcissism should bring about greater managerial attention to a new technology, as narcissistic CEOs will be highly alert to the exciting new development and will spur their management teams to do likewise. This link, too, should be moderated by the current degree of audience engagement, with narcissistic CEOs encouraging their organizations to cognitively focus on the new direction in proportion to how captivated observers seem to be. And, following from related research (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Kaplan, 2008a) , we expect managerial attention to be a precursor of investment. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 72 CEOs of 33 U.S. research-based pharmaceutical firms, examining their strategic initiatives in biotechnology over the period 1980 to 2008.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Incumbents' Responses to Discontinuous Technologies
A discontinuous technology is a novel method for creating and capturing value, which departs ''dramatically from the norm of continuous incremental innovation'' (Anderson and Tushman, 1990: 606) and from the traditional innovation trajectory (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Christensen and Bower, 1996) . As such, a technological discontinuity typically contradicts the prevailing mindset in an industry, rendering existing organizational structures and processes obsolete and diminishing the value of existing knowledge (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) . Prominent examples of discontinuous technologies are steel mini-mills (Christensen, 1997) and online news (Gilbert, 2005) .
Researchers initially portrayed incumbent firms as generally inert when faced with a discontinuous technology (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) , invoking multiple logics for explaining such behaviors. Incumbents often lack the incentive to adopt the new approach (Christensen and Bower, 1996) , particularly if the company is a strong performer with the traditional technology (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; Ghemawat, 1991) or if its assets, skills, and other resources are all configured for the existing technology (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010) . Relatedly, political dynamics-say, resistance from powerful functional departments that would stand to lose-can retard a company's adoption of a new technology (Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli, 1986; Pfeffer, 1992; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008) .
More recently, researchers have recognized that incumbents vary in their efforts to adopt discontinuous technologies (Kaplan, 2008a) . Among the factors identified as contributing to such variability are a company's capabilities (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010) and ''stock market identities'' of individual firms (Benner, 2007: 708) . Due to these and other factors, incumbent firms vary in their degree of adoption, i.e., the relative magnitude, or even in the number of strategic initiatives dedicated to the new technology. For instance, a company that, in a given year, engages in two new alliances, makes an acquisition, and launches several internal R&D efforts in the direction of the new technology has a greater degree of adoption than a company that just engages in one new alliance that year.
In another recent theoretical thrust, researchers have invoked a cognitive framework for considering technological adaptation (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008) . Drawing primarily on Ocasio's (1997) ''attentionbased view,'' scholars have proposed that firms vary in the degree to which they attach significance to, or are even aware of, new technologies. By their very nature, discontinuous technologies deviate from prevailing logics and mindsets, and they carry considerable ambiguity in terms of whether and how they will ever work (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) . As such, there is ample scope for a host of interpretive processes when managers are confronted with information about radical new technologies. Managers may discount information that does not fit their preexisting paradigms (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) ; or they may apply decision rules that were developed under the earlier technological regime but that are not suitable for judging the promise of the new technology (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . In some cases, managers may have developed emotional attachments to the current profiles of their firms, in the form of ''identities,'' which cause them to overlook or downplay the merits of new approaches (Tripsas, 2009; Livengood and Reger, 2010) .
In sum, there are numerous interconnected reasons why some, perhaps many, incumbent firms are timid in committing to new discontinuous technologies. But incumbents are not uniform in their responses; some invest aggressively, defying inertia. Such instances would seem to represent distinctive acts of managerial volition, and thus it makes sense to consider the attributes of the executives who would take these actions.
Executives' Influence on Organizational Outcomes
Building on the concept of bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) , Hambrick and Mason (1984) set forth their upper echelons perspective, proposing that executives make choices through highly personalized lenses, which are an outgrowth of their experiences, values, personalities, and other individual factors. A large share of upper echelons research focuses on the particular influence of CEOs on organizational outcomes. In this, scholars do not presume that CEOs single-handedly formulate all major decisions. Although they might generate some strategic ideas, they more typically react to initiatives advanced by other members of the organization, by accepting or rejecting project proposals, as well as by showing enthusiasm or disdain when doing so (Burgelman, 1983) . Moreover, CEOs influence strategy by establishing or modifying the context by which others generate and promote their proposals; CEOs create this context through the executives they hire and fire, the incentives they put in place, and the structural arrangements they adopt (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 2002) . In short, CEOs influence strategic outcomes in multiple ways, well beyond designing and executing choices on their own.
Given the importance of CEOs, studies from fields other than upper echelons research have also shown a growing interest in the effects of CEOs' attributes on strategy and performance. For example, finance scholars have demonstrated that CEOs' age and education (specifically having a Master's of Business Administration degree) are associated with certain corporate financial policies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) , and psychologists have examined the effects of CEOs' personality on the dynamics of top management teams (Peterson et al., 2003) . We focus on one particularly intriguing personality dimension of executives: narcissism.
The Narcissistic Personality
The concept of narcissism entered the psychology literature a century ago (Ellis, 1898; Freud, 1914) , referring to a clinical disorder characterized by Gerstner et al. 261 excessive self-admiration, self-aggrandizement, and a tendency to see others as an extension of one's self. Although clinicians still view narcissism as a pathology, personality psychologists see narcissism as a dimension on which all individuals can be arrayed, defined as the degree to which an individual has an inflated sense of self and is preoccupied with having that self-view continuously reinforced (Emmons, 1984; Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004; Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006) .
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After hundreds of studies, both to develop instruments to measure narcissism (Raskin and Hall, 1979) and to examine its broader psychological and behavioral implications (e.g., Emmons, 1984; Rhodewalt and Morf, 1998; Bogart, Benotsch, and Pavlovic, 2004) , researchers have confirmed that narcissism is a multifaceted personality characteristic, emanating from both genetic factors and parental relations, and is characterized by several primary dispositional tendencies. Narcissists have a strong sense of superiority (Emmons, 1987) , perceiving themselves as highly intelligent and feeling great confidence in their abilities (Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1988; Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004; Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006) . Narcissists strive to dominate their environments (Raskin, Novacek, and Hogan, 1991; Pratto et al., 1994) . For instance, narcissists are eager to lead others and openly show high aspirations (Emmons, 1987) . Narcissists show a high degree of restlessness (Deluga, 1997) . They are prone to feelings of boredom (Wink and Donahue, 1997) and therefore engage in more sensation-seeking than do non-narcissists (Emmons, 1987) . Narcissists generally lack empathy (Watson et al., 1984) , often having little ability to comprehend or share another's ''state of mind'' or emotion (Lubit, 2002) . And narcissists show a strong need for attention and applause (Kohut and Wolf, 1986; Buss and Chiodo, 1991) , perceiving the world as a stage and constantly seeking the role of protagonist (Morf and Rhodewalt, 2001; Bogart, Benotsch, and Pavlovic, 2004) .
Thus, from a cognitive standpoint, narcissists are very confident they can prevail in challenging settings; from a motivational standpoint, narcissists continuously crave to have their superiority reaffirmed. The fuel for this reaffirmation, which Kernberg (1975) called ''narcissistic supply,'' can come from narcissists themselves, primarily in the forms of exhibitionism and diminishment of others (Bogart, Benotsch, and Pavlovic, 2004) . More importantly, however, narcissistic supply flows from others, in the forms of attention and adulation (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002) . Thus highly narcissistic individuals, compared with those who are less narcissistic, will attach higher probabilities of success to any and all alternatives that entail some perceived aspects of their skill or agentic wherewithal, and such individuals will be especially drawn to those actions that have the potential to impress audiences for their inherent boldness or daring.
CEO Narcissism and Responses to Technological Discontinuities
Following Hambrick's (2007, 2011) findings that differences in narcissistic tendencies among CEOs were associated with strategic behaviors of firms, we expect that CEOs of incumbent companies will vary in their narcissistic tendencies in ways that influence their responses to technological discontinuities. A highly narcissistic CEO has a strong sense of personal capability, translating into extreme confidence, which in turn mitigates perceptions of ambiguity or uncertainty associated with the new development. A less narcissistic CEO might dwell on the inherent riskiness of an unproven technology Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Gilbert, 2005) , but a narcissistic CEO will tend to see the technology as feasible and thus will pursue it more aggressively. We envision that highly narcissistic CEOs will not view new technologies as exogenous eventualities but, instead, as conquerable, or susceptible to human and organizational mastery (Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006) . Such leaders will believe that it is precisely their organizations, under their leadership, that can make the new technology work.
Moreover, aggressive investment in a discontinuous technology will help feed the narcissistic CEO's need for attention (Deluga, 1997; Wink and Donahue, 1997; Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004) . While less narcissistic CEOs will estimate payoffs based on the eventual profits from the new technology, more narcissistic CEOs will not only figure in those eventual payoffs (which, again, because of supreme confidence, will be seen as relatively great) but also will add to their calculus the anticipation of widespread notice and admiration that will come to them-say, from others in the industry and the press-for boldly investing in the new technology. The fact that discontinuous technologies are alien and unconventional may cause non-narcissists to hesitate in adopting them (March, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Miller, 1993) ; but these very features, which tend to enhance the drama of any investment initiatives, hold inherent appeal for highly narcissistic CEOs. Therefore we propose:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more narcissistic an established company's CEO, the greater the company's degree of adoption of a discontinuous technology.
Audience Engagement as a Moderator of Narcissistic Tendencies
Part of what makes the narcissistic personality so intriguing is that supreme confidence is paradoxically accompanied by a ''fragile'' self-esteem (Kernis, 2005) and a great sensitivity to ''ego threats'' (Pincus and Roche, 2011: 32) . Among the greatest threats to a narcissist's psyche is being unnoticed or ignored. Therefore narcissists crave attention (Emmons, 1984) and correspondingly tend to engage in various forms of grandstanding and colorful behaviors in efforts to obtain ''narcissistic supply'' (Kernberg, 1975) . Given their need for attention, narcissists exert themselves more when they know an audience is watching, and especially when they anticipate that the attentive audience will be impressed by what they witness (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002) . Of course, an audience might be impressed by an extraordinary performance outcome (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011) . But an audience also will be impressed by bold and daring actions, in and of themselves, even if the performance outcome is not yet known. Just as a high-wire performer elicits more ''oohs and aahs'' from the crowd when he starts his walk than when he finishes it, so too can a CEO garner note-even if not immediate investor approval, as Benner (2010) showed-from taking actions that are widely seen as bold or challenging. Indeed, the narcissistic CEO will be propelled by the Gerstner et al. 263 prospect of having his or her actions prominently described as ''exciting,''''intriguing,''''gutsy,''''bold,''''risky,'' or even less flatteringly, as ''wild'' or ''bizarre.'' But in order for there to be any prospect of such acclaim for an action, an audience must be assembled and engaged with that respective domain of action. Accordingly, narcissistic CEOs will be mindful of, and motivated by, audience engagement, which is the degree to which observers view a domain, such as a new technology, as noteworthy and provocative. As Wallace and Baumeister (2002: 820) said, ''Because narcissists are so obsessed with self-enhancement, they should be keenly aware that some performance tasks offer more potential for self-enhancement than others.'' An engaged audience is a central ingredient in providing the potential for narcissistic self-enhancement. In our context, then, we envision the narcissistic CEO as implicitly asking, on an on-going basis, ''If I now invest in biotech, will it be seen as bold, challenging, provocative?'' Any new technology, especially one that is purported to hold the promise of being transformational, might be thought of as perennially high-engagement. But audience engagement with a new technology can rise or fall over time. In its earliest days, a new technology might be so remote and esoteric that only a few experts can comprehend its potential significance. The technology might then go on to garner more audience engagement, even a widespread and captivated following. There might then be ups and downs in audience engagement as occasional breakthroughs occur or as development stalls (see Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001 , for a case study on media attention to industry events). And then ultimately the technology might reach a point at which it is seen as commonplace and when audience engagement would be minimal. We are not proposing a predictable series of phases but, instead, simply view audience engagement with a new technology as potentially varying over time. Therefore we anticipate that a narcissistic CEO will not only be relatively likely to invest in a discontinuous technology (as argued in H1) but will be especially motivated to invest when audience engagement with the new technology is running high. When the audience is highly captivated, the narcissistic CEO will tend to envision that his or her initiatives will be widely hailed, not necessarily for their wisdom as much as for their daring. Thus:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The positive relationship between CEO narcissism and a company's degree of adoption of a discontinuous technology will be amplified by the degree of audience engagement with the technology.
The Mediating Role of Managerial Attention to the Discontinuous Technology
In recent years, scholars have introduced a cognitive perspective to help understand organizational adoption of new technologies. Drawing particularly on Ocasio's (1997) attention-based view, theorists have argued that one of the great barriers to adoption is a lack of managerial attention, i.e., the failure of top executives to recognize and/or cognitively digest a new technology (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003) . According to this perspective, it is only by paying attention to a new technology that managers will be able to act on it.
Relatively little work, however, has attempted to understand the origins, or determinants, of managerial attention. Although early research considered the cognitively confining influences of managerial tenure (Starbuck and Milliken, 264 Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013) 1988; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993) , and some recent research has focused on such determinants as top management team composition (e.g., Cho and Hambrick, 2006) and interorganizational relationships (Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2012) , we are not aware of any research that has considered CEO personality as a driver of managerial attention. If we conceptualize managerial attention as the degree to which a firm's senior managers (including the CEO) are collectively aware of and cognitively focused on some phenomenon (such as biotech), we can envision that CEOs shape managerial attention patterns in ways that suit their personal preferences. Depending on the issues that CEOs themselves deem to be important, they will influence other top executives to focus on the very same ''issues and answers'' (Ocasio, 1997) . Moreover, CEOs have leeway over ''attention structures'' and are thus able to set up subunits, task forces, and incentives to promote their personally favored agendas (Ocasio, 1997) . CEOs also direct attention patterns by providing a model to others, explicitly or implicitly, for how they should devote their time, and particularly about which issues warrant the most (and least) consideration. In this latter vein, CEOs can exert their power and legitimacy to prevail in ''framing contests,'' or the cognitive-political tensions that arise in top management teams to determine the primacy of a given strategic issue (Kaplan, 2008b) .
In short, if a highly narcissistic CEO is personally energized about a new technology, he or she will spur the entire top management of the firm to pay attention to it. Compared with a less narcissistic CEO, who might not be as interested in the new breakthrough, a narcissistic CEO will use organizational structures and processes, as well as his or her own persuasive behaviorswhich, for narcissists, can be considerable (Goncalo, Flynn, and Kim, 2010) -to direct overall managerial attention to the new thrust:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more narcissistic an established company's CEO, the greater the managerial attention to a discontinuous technology.
In further keeping with the narcissist's motives, such a CEO will promote managerial attention to a new technology in proportion to how much audience engagement exists at the time. Bearing in mind that audience enthrallment with a technology can ebb and flow, and envisioning that managerial attention to a technology can similarly rise and fall, we anticipate that the narcissistic CEO will press for more attention at those times when a respected audience considers the technology as provocative and noteworthy:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The positive effect of CEO narcissism on managerial attention is amplified by the current degree of audience engagement with the new technology.
Following from prior research indicating that managerial attention to an issue or domain tends to be followed by strategic actions in that domain (e.g., Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Cho and Hambrick, 2006) , we propose the following:
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The greater the managerial attention to a discontinuous technology, the greater the degree of the company's adoption of the discontinuous technology.
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Correspondingly, then, we expect managerial attention to be a mediator between CEO narcissism and investments in a discontinuous technology: narcissism brings about attention, which in turn brings about investment:
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The positive association between CEO narcissism and a company's degree of adoption of a discontinuous technology (as expressed in H1) is mediated by managerial attention to the technology.
METHODOLOGY Empirical Setting
We examined the reactions of established, research-based pharmaceutical (pharma) companies to the emergence of biotechnology, over the period 1980 to 2008. The pharma industry is highly suitable for our study because it is characterized by a high degree of managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) , and there are abundant data on firms' behaviors. Most importantly, however, this industry represents an archetypal case of incumbent firms being confronted with a profound discontinuous change, the emergence of biotechnology Zucker and Darby, 1997; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2007) . While traditional pharma R&D is based on chemical synthesis and trial-anderror screening of potential compounds, biotech R&D revolves around the understanding of living organisms, requiring deep expertise in molecular biology (Pisano, 2006) . Thus the adoption of biotechnology demands new skills, especially in R&D but also in production, rendering existing assets and competencies in these upstream functions far less valuable, if not obsolete (Schweizer, 2005) . Still, incumbent pharmaceutical companies were able to temporarily sustain their revenues from existing products by relying on their downstream assets: extensive sales forces, strong brands, and patent-protected products (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005) . Because of these residual benefits from the old technology (Siggelkow, 2001) , and because of the considerable technological and commercial ambiguity of the new technology, many established companies hesitated to invest in biotech (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003) . In short, there was considerable variance in firms' responses to this new approach.
Sample
We conducted a detailed search of multiple databases (Osiris, Mergent, Ward's Business Directory, Thomson SDC Platinum) to identify all firms that met the following criteria during any part of the period 1980 to 2008: (a) primary Standard Industry Code of 2834, (b) headquarters in the U.S., and (c) revenues of more than $100 million (in 2008 US dollars). We excluded firms with less than 40 percent of sales derived from pharmaceuticals, following the approach of Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson (2003) , to ensure that all sampled companies had a substantial stake in the established industry. As some companies exited (by being acquired), this procedure yielded an unbalanced panel of 33 distinct companies, representing nearly the entire U.S. pharmaceutical industry.
Sample companies generated more than 80 percent of the annual U.S. pharma sales of U.S.-based companies.
Next we used SEC filings and LexisNexis to identify all those CEOs in our firms who were in office in 1980 or later and had three or more years of tenure within our study period (to allow for measurement of narcissism). This generated 78 CEOs for the 33 companies, which (after missing data) allowed us to test the effects of CEO narcissism on a total of 72 CEOs and 521 companyyears. Although our sample of firms is not large in an absolute sense, it represents essentially the entire population of major science-based pharma companies over the period of interest, and it is comparable to, or even larger than, the samples used in related studies of this industry. For instance, Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson (2003) observed 15 firms over 23 years, and Rothaermel and Hess (2007) observed 35 global firms over 22 years.
Dependent Variables
Degree of biotech adoption. We measured the degree of biotech adoption by summing the number of new strategic initiatives in biotech-formations of biotech alliances, acquisitions of biotech companies, and launches of organic biotech R&D projects-for each year (t) of a given CEO's tenure (results were similar when we standardized and averaged the indicators).
2 Our count of strategic initiatives is similar to the measure used in prior research on the adoption of biotechnology (e.g., Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003) . Alliances, acquisitions, and new organic projects represent a collectively exhaustive array of potential paths to new technology adoption (Porter, 1987) ; moreover, they are all directly controllable by the CEO, especially in comparison with output-related measures, such as the number of research publications or patents. Counts of the three types of initiatives co-varied significantly for each firm-year (correlations between .33 and .43, p < .01). Acquisition data were from Thomson SDC Platinum; alliance data were from Recombinant Capital (ReCap) prior to 1990 and from the Windover Strategic Transaction Database from 1991 to 2008; we counted new organic biotech projects using the Pharmaprojects pipeline database (and annual reports before 1986).
Managerial attention to biotechnology. As it is impossible to measure managerial cognition directly, a number of researchers have relied on the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (Sapir, 1944; Whorf, 1956) : that individuals' and collectives' thoughts (attention, cognitive categories, priorities, etc.) are reflected in the words they use, as well as how frequently they use them (e.g., Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Kaplan, 2008a) . In this vein, we followed the content analysis approach of Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson (2003) for measuring managerial attention to biotech, counting the number of biotech-related words (e.g., ''biotech,'' ''monoclonal antibody'') in each firm's annual letter to shareholders for each year t-1 (the year prior to the year for measuring investment) and dividing this count by the number of paragraphs in the letter; we then multiplied by 100, to allow more interpretable regression coefficients.
3 Thus our measure indicates the relative amount of attention being devoted to biotech. Whereas Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson (2003) described their similar measure as capturing ''CEO attention,'' we see it as more accurately reflecting overall ''managerial attention.'' In interviews, for instance, Cho and Hambrick (2006) determined that letters to shareholders are typically the result of multiple rounds of inputs from multiple top executives, not just CEOs (and not just public relations staffs). While we recognize that such letters carry symbolic and persuasive elements (for instance, targeted at securities analysts), we believe our measure is a valid, albeit imprecise, gauge of managerial attention patterns. We accessed all letters through Thomson One Banker and, in some cases, Thomson Reuters microfilm archives. Figure 1 shows the annual (per-firm) averages of the two dependent variables over time. Bearing in mind that there was considerable interfirm variance (which of course is our chief interest), biotech investments commenced around 1980, grew steeply (but irregularly) until 1997, and then grew more slowly until the end of our panel. Managerial attention did not exactly track with investments (and, again, interfirm variance was substantial), but it too followed an upward trend, especially after 1999. 
Given the difficulties of obtaining personality data directly from executives, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) developed an index of CEO narcissistic tendencies using several unobtrusive indicators. They provided a comprehensive justification for their indicators, emphasizing that they are reflective of the narcissistic personality, and they are all considerably under the control of individual CEOs and hence are somewhat reflective of their personal styles. For example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007: 365) mapped the indicators onto the elements of the narcissistic personality (see their table 1) and showed in validation tests that their index was much more a property of individual CEOs than of their companies (using data on successive CEOs and multi-time CEOs); moreover, a panel of securities analysts rated the narcissistic tendencies of individual CEOs very much in line with the unobtrusive index scores.
We adapted Chatterjee and Hambrick's (2007) approach, constructing a 4-item index, and we conducted additional validation tests. We calculated the four items using data from the second and third years of each CEO's tenure averaged together (avoiding the first year because of anomalies associated with successions); thus each CEO had an invariant narcissism score, consistent with the premise that narcissistic tendencies are relatively stable within individuals. (1) Following Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) , and in line with recent research in personal psychology (Buffardi and Campbell, 2008) , we measured prominence of the CEO's photograph in the company's annual report on a fourpoint-scale: four points if the CEO's photo was of him or her alone and larger than half a page; three points if it was of him or her alone and less than half a page; two points if the CEO was photographed together with one or more other executives; and one point if there was no photo. (2) Somewhat differently from Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) , we assessed the CEO's prominence in the company's press releases by the ratio of the number of times the CEO's name was mentioned in all releases divided by the number of times the second-highest paid executive was mentioned-we did not divide by the total number of words in all the press releases, as Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) did, because press releases in this industry often include voluminous text on product instructions, product warnings, and results from clinical studies. For this indicator, we used all the company's press releases found in Factiva. (3) The CEO's relative cash compensation (salary and bonus) was the CEO's cash compensation divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm. (4) The CEO's relative non-cash compensation (deferred income, stock grants, and stock options) was the ratio of the CEOs non-cash compensation to that of the second-highest-paid executive. We had to drop the fifth indicator, the CEO's use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, because the requisite data were not available in digital form or in sufficient quantities per year before 1997. 4 One might be concerned about the possibility that the four ingredients of the narcissism index, especially the compensation-based indicators, are a reflection of the CEO's ''quality'' rather than personality. Note, however, that we coded narcissism early in each CEO's tenure, before a track record was apparent. Moreover, as our endogeneity test (described below) will show, CEOs from the outside did not have higher narcissism scores. Further supported by our validation tests, we believe our index is a generally valid but imprecise gauge of narcissism. Gerstner et al. 269 In line with the narcissism index that Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) developed for computer-firm CEOs, the items in our index strongly cohered for pharma company CEOs. Pearson correlations among the individual indicators ranged from .26 to .49, and all were significant (one correlation at p < .01, four at p < .05, and one at p < .10). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06) and traditional reliability tests (Cronbach's alpha .71) showed results above recommended standards.
5 These evidences of reliability allowed us to average the four indicators into a narcissism index.
Following Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) , we further tested the validity of our index by asking a panel of 11 securities analysts with more than 10 years of pharma industry experience to rate on a 5-point Likert scale the degree of narcissism of 16 CEOs in our sample (those who had served for three or more years after 2000, to enhance the likelihood that the analysts would be directly familiar with them). We explicitly asked the analysts to rate only those CEOs whose personalities they were fairly sure about. On average, each analyst rated 10 (of the 16) CEOs, and each CEO was rated by at least two analysts (on average seven). As in Chatterjee and Hambrick's (2007) study, the analysts' average ratings were highly consistent with our unobtrusive narcissism index, as evidenced by a correlation of .73 (p < .01). Thus we have further corroboration that our index reflects, at least somewhat, the narcissistic tendencies of the CEOs we studied.
Because we viewed our narcissism index as a manifestation of CEO personality, it was essential that we also show that the index was not primarily a reflection of firm-specific factors. To confirm that our index is more of a CEO attribute than a firm attribute, we compared the degree of consistency over time for each of these two units of analysis. We examined the correlation between each CEO's narcissism score in the second and third tenure years (averaged) and fourth and fifth tenure years (averaged). The correlation was .53, and highly significant (p < .01). As a comparison, we examined the association between the narcissism scores (in years 2 and 3) of the CEOs in our sample with the scores of their immediate predecessors and successors in our sample (a total of 34 dyads). The correlation between successive CEOs' narcissism scores was .11, and not significant. Thus our index seems to be much more a reflection of each CEO than of any persistent firm-level tendencies.
Moderator: Audience Engagement
Our new construct, audience engagement, required a novel measure of the degree to which external observers viewed the biotech domain as provocative, exciting, and challenging. For this measure, we conducted content analysis of articles about biotechnology published between 1980 and 2008 in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, the two most prominent national newspapers in the United States. We first searched Factiva for all articles in these two outlets that contained ''biotech'' (or ''biotechnology'') in their headlines, finding 1,751 such articles. Then we had five trained coders go through these articles carefully to find all statements that referred to health-related biotech, excluding, for instance, statements about agriculturally oriented biotech.
From this group, the coders then selected those statements that referred to biotech in evaluative terms, rather than simply descriptive terms. Such statements commented on biotech with regard to its implications for individual companies, the economy, society, politics, or the environment. We included any such statements by the articles' authors themselves, as well as by others who were quoted in the articles.
We trained the coders to look for two broad types of evaluative statements. The first were statements that conveyed a positive outlook for biotech, typically expressing enthusiasm or excitement, such as this one in 1993: ''It is the biotechnology industry that holds the greatest promise for finding effective treatment and cures for the world's most dreaded diseases.'' The second type of evaluative statements were those that portrayed biotech as challenging, difficult, or risky. Here is an example from 1985: ''Of all the possible high-tech investments, biotechnology is among the riskiest. Research is lengthy, costly, and often fruitless.'' The coders, working with one of the authors, developed comprehensive coding guidelines to ensure maximum interrater consistency (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . We first had multiple coders assess nearly half of all the statements; then, having determined that interrater reliability was highly acceptable (Krippendorff's, 2004, alpha of .74), we reverted to single coders for the rest of the statements and regularly rechecked for reliability.
The coders identified a total of 1,957 statements that portrayed biotech as exciting and/or challenging (the within-year correlation between these two types of evaluative statements was .90). Assuming that CEOs (perhaps especially narcissists) are aware of recent and current levels of audience engagement, our final measure was the average number of evaluative statements (in both newspapers combined) for the focal year and the prior year. Figure 2 shows this measure over time (in our analyses, we multiplied by 100, to allow more interpretable regression). As can be seen, audience engagement climbed fairly steadily from 1980 to 1994; it then receded, as biotech became more 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Audience Engagement Year Gerstner et al. 271 commonplace; then, around 1999, audience engagement spiked again, perhaps due to considerable excitement surrounding breakthroughs in genome sequencing (Pisano, 2006) , as well as attention to the first biotech product to attain blockbuster status ($1 billion in annual revenues) (Hamilton, 2005) ; beyond 2000, audience engagement with biotech dropped fairly steadily until 2008.
Control Variables
We controlled for an array of potentially confounding factors. Perhaps most importantly, we included calendar year dummies, which effectively controlled for all time-specific factors. Because large and old firms may face bureaucratic momentum, but also possess more capabilities to adopt biotechnology (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008) , we controlled for annual firm size (revenues t-1 , deflated by the consumer price index) and firm age in 1980, except for tests of H3 and H4, which were tested with ''xtreg, f(ixed) e(ffects)'' in Stata. To control for slack, we included the ratio of current assets to current liabilities t-1 (Greenley and Oktemgil, 1998) . We also controlled for the prior year's performance, measured by operating income as a percentage of sales t-1 , to control both for the availability of resources and the possibility of risk-seeking tendencies by firms with low returns (Audia and Greve, 2006) , as well as for the tendency for narcissists to be relatively less responsive to recent performance than are non-narcissists (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011) . We controlled comprehensively for each firm's preexisting capabilities in science and biotech. Using R&D spending relative to total revenues t-1 (Zucker and Darby, 1997), we controlled for prior commitment to science. To further control for the capability to absorb new scientific knowledge, we measured the total number of scientific publications per firm year t-1 , using ISI Web of Science (Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern, 2000) . In addition, when testing H1, H2, and H5b, we included a count of the focal firm's non-biotech acquisitions (within and outside the pharma industry) in any given year to control for the possibility that CEO narcissism drives grandiose initiatives in general Hambrick, 2007, 2011) . As prior biotech adoption may determine future adoption, we also controlled for the firm's cumulative number of biotech initiatives (alliances, acquisitions, and R&D projects) in the year prior to each focal CEO's arrival, using the composite measure of the degree of adoption. In a similar vein, we controlled for prior (pre-CEO) managerial attention to biotechnology when testing H3 and H4.
Because CEOs' tendencies to act may vary over time, we controlled for CEO age t-1 and CEO's tenure t-1 (in office). We also controlled for the CEO's power (Finkelstein, 1992) , with a dummy for whether the CEO was also board chairman (duality) for each year t-1 , as well as the percentage of company stock owned by the CEO t-1 . Because some CEOs delegate operational matters, as a way to free themselves for more strategic or long-term initiatives, we also included a binary indicator of whether the firm had a chief operating officer (COO) t-1 . For these CEO controls, we used proxy statements.
To measure the CEO's own technological orientation, either to biotech or to traditional pharma technology, we used the following coding: 1 for R&D experience of two or more years in the biotech industry or a biotech-related graduate degree (e.g., biology); -1 for R&D experience of two or more years in the traditional pharmaceutical industry or a graduate degree related to traditional 272 Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013) pharma technology (e.g., pharmacy or chemistry); 0 for all other cases. We collected these data from Marquis Who's Who and SEC filings. We controlled for endogeneity, or the possibility that narcissistic CEOs are attracted by or hired into specific situations and/or that narcissistic tendencies emerge under certain conditions. Following the two-step approach of Heckman (1979) , we first regressed several antecedent and contemporaneous variables against our measure of CEO narcissism. The antecedents (measured in the year prior to the CEO's start), included firm revenues, firm age, calendar year, and ROE, as these factors might affect narcissistic tendencies. The contemporaneous variables (measured in the CEO's second tenure year), included CEO duality, CEO age, and CEO origin (a dummy indicating if the CEO was an outside hire, defined as having arrived at the firm within two years prior to becoming CEO). Two of these variables, firm age and calendar year, were significantly associated with CEO narcissism (p < .01) in correlations and multivariate regression.
6 As the second step in the Heckman correction, we created a predicted narcissism score for each CEO, based on the significant variables from step one, and included it as a control in the main analyses.
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Estimation Methods
We used firm fixed effects models for all our analyses (although we obtained nearly equivalent results with random-effects models). Fixed effects controls for persistent, difficult-to-observe firm attributes, such as capabilities, culture, or enduring routines. Moreover, Hausman's test (1978) indicated fixed effects as more appropriate. Finally, because the sample was not randomly drawn, but instead represented almost the entire U.S. pharmaceutical industry over the observed period, random effects were not called for (Hsiao, 2003) . We should emphasize that firm fixed effects neither heightens nor suppresses the potential for any CEO effects. Every firm in our sample had multiple CEOs over the years observed (on average about three per firm), with varying narcissism levels across CEOs (recall that the narcissism scores of successive CEOs were essentially uncorrelated).
Because our two dependent variables differed in their basic forms-degree of adoption was a limited-range count variable (with many zero scores), while managerial attention was a normally distributed continuous variable-we used different methods for estimating them. For estimating the degree of adoption, we followed Allison and Waterman's (2002) approach of using a Poisson specification (with dummies for each firm, to control for firm fixed effects) and then corrected standard errors for overdispersion by multiplying the standard errors by ''the square root of the ratio of the Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit 6 Interestingly, the increase of CEO narcissism over time was consistent with, and similar in magnitude to, the findings by Twenge et al. (2008) , who observed an increase of narcissism in the general population over the years 1979 to 2006. 7 The mean level of CEO narcissism among the CEOs in our sample increased moderately (by 17 percent) between 1980 and 2008 (~.5 percent per annum). But as an additional way to detect any spurious effect of time as a driver of both CEO narcissism (Twenge et al., 2008) and investment intensity in biotechnology, we re-ran all models with a clock variable counting from 1 to 29 for each year 1980 to 2008, with no change in our results. Additionally, we ran models with CEO succession as a dummy variable (Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992) , testing for the possible effect of CEO transitions as a catalyst of change, again with no change in hypothesized results. Gerstner et al. 273 statistic to its degrees of freedom'' (Allison and Waterman, 2002: 257) . We experimented with other corrections for overdispersion, with no notable changes. In analyses of managerial attention, we used a robust firm fixed effects estimator using the Huber-White standard error correction. In all interaction tests, we mean-centered the component variables. We discuss our moderation and mediation analyses as we present them below. Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables. Variance inflation factors for all variables were below 5.0, and on average 2.11, well below the recommended maximum of 10 (O'Brien, 2007). Thus multicollinearity was not a problem. Table 2 presents the results of our tests of the effect of CEO narcissism on the degree of biotech adoption. We present four models: one with control variables, one that adds CEO narcissism, one that adds audience engagement, 
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* Standard errors are in parentheses. Calendar year dummies and firm year dummies are included in all models. y Variable is centered at its mean. Gerstner et al. 275 and one that adds the interaction of CEO narcissism and audience engagement.
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As seen in model 2, CEO narcissism was significantly positively associated (p < .01) with biotech adoption, providing preliminary support for hypothesis 1. In model 3, we added audience engagement, and CEO narcissism continued to be significant. Finally, in model 4, we tested the interaction of CEO narcissism and audience engagement, observing considerable support for hypothesis 2. Specifically, the interaction of narcissism and audience engagement was significantly positively associated with the degree of biotech adoption (p < .05).
Because degree of biotech adoption is a count variable, we used a nonlinear Poisson regression model in all models predicting degree of adoption. In nonlinear models, the significant effect of the interaction between CEO narcissism and audience engagement requires further exploration, which is easier to interpret when graphically shown, as in figure 4 (Hoetker, 2007; Greene, 2012) . The lefthand graph in figure 3 shows the probabilities of one or more biotech initiatives per year under conditions of high and low audience engagement (plus/ minus 1 s.d. from mean), for different values of CEO narcissism (using the Stata command ''prvalue''). The righthand graph in figure 3 is the same, except that it shows the probabilities of two or more biotech initiatives. In both graphs, the probabilities of biotech initiatives increase with CEO narcissism, but the (Hilbe, 2011: 69) . The decreasing AIC values from model 1 to model 2 and from model 3 to model 4 indicate that the goodness of fit increases when including CEO narcissism and the interaction of CEO narcissism and audience engagement.
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Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013) increase is especially steep under conditions of high audience engagement. Thus a combination of high narcissism and high audience engagement was associated with an exceptionally high incidence of biotech initiatives, in support of H4. Table 3 presents results for the effect of CEO narcissism on managerial attention to biotech, arrayed in the same way as table 2. As seen in model 2, CEO narcissism was significantly positively associated with managerial attention to biotech (p < .05), providing preliminary support for hypothesis 3. The * Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 436 due to the limited availability of processable letters to shareholders.
All models include calendar year dummies.
y Variable is centered at its mean. Gerstner et al. 277 effect of narcissism remained after including the effect of audience engagement (model 3). Moreover, in model 4, we tested and found support for hypothesis 4: the interaction of CEO narcissism and audience engagement was significantly positively related to managerial attention to biotech (p < .01). We report the results for tests of H5a and H5b in the Appendix because there were no significant effects. At odds with H5a, managerial attention was not associated with the degree of biotech investment (we experimented with various lagging structures, but with no notable change in results). It logically follows, then, that managerial attention was not a mediator of the association between CEO narcissism and biotech investment, which was further confirmed by a non-significant Baron and Kenny (1986) test. Thus managerial attention neither directly influenced the degree of biotech adoption, nor was it a mediator of the association between CEO narcissism and the degree of biotech adoption.
The results of our hypothesis testing showed that pharma companies led by relatively narcissistic CEOs made more investments in biotech than did companies led by less narcissistic CEOs (H1). We also found that the impelling effect of CEO narcissism on investment was moderated by the degree of audience engagement at the time (H2): narcissists invested in biotech especially aggressively when audience captivation was running high. Similarly, CEO narcissism was positively related to managerial attention to biotech (H3), and this relationship, too, was moderated by audience engagement (H4). But we did not find evidence that managerial attention gave rise to investment (H5a) or that managerial attention was a mediator between narcissism and investment (H5b).
DISCUSSION
Our study introduces a new vantage for understanding the adaptive responses of incumbent firms in the face of an external shift. Whereas scholars have overwhelmingly emphasized environmental and organizational factors to explain firms' (non-)adaptiveness (Ahuja, Lampert and Tandon, 2008) and more recently have examined the role of the top management team's attributes (Cho and Hambrick, 2006) , we considered the qualities of individual business leaders, specifically the personalities of CEOs. This focus on executive disposition as a determinant of companies' responses to technological discontinuities holds broad promise for two reasons. First, because major technological shifts call for radically new strategic priorities, diverging from the status quo, companies' responses require volitional, concerted executive action. While more incremental types of organizational realignments might fruitfully be modeled as evolutionary or bottom-up processes (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983) , responses to technological discontinuities, which are typically antithetical to an incumbent company's core capabilities and processes, will almost always require deliberate managerial choice, typically involving the CEO (Burgelman, 2002) . Second, the emergence of a new technology is invariably laden with ambiguity and uncertainty, which is exactly the type of context in which decision makers' personal biases affect their behaviors (Mischel, 1977) . When stimuli are clear and compelling, choices are similarly clear, but when stimuli are complex and contradictory, there is abundant scope for human interpretive processes.
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Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013) Drawing from upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) , we find evidence that narcissism in CEOs serves as a drive for overcoming the inertia that is widely thought to prevail in established firms (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . When other CEOs see risk and uncertainty, the narcissist's supreme confidence allows him or her to invest aggressively. Moreover, given the CEO's anticipation that investment in an unproven technology will be seen as daring, such an action feeds the narcissist's craving for admiration. CEO narcissism not only brings about strategic dynamism and grandiosity in a company's current domain, as Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) showed, but it also propels actions in highly path-divergent domains, such as discontinuous technologies.
Audience Engagement in the Context of Technological Change
In introducing the concept of audience engagement, our study adds to understanding of the contextual conditions under which the behavioral tendencies of narcissists will be most pronounced. Beyond Chatterjee and Hambrick's (2007) conclusion that narcissistic CEOs have a general tendency to engage in grandiose strategic behaviors, we argue and find that there are some conditions under which narcissistic CEOs are especially likely to engage in bolder actions than their less narcissistic peers, specifically, when an audience is alert and captivated by the domain of action (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002) .
Our findings in this vein are noteworthy in at least two ways. First, by showing that narcissists' investment actions vary according to the current level of audience engagement, our results suggest that narcissists are motivated by their anticipation of audience admiration that will accompany their actions, in and of themselves, quite apart from any anticipation of applause for eventual success. Even the most narcissistic CEOs in our sample must have known that any demonstrable successes from biotech investments would only become evident far in the future, when audience engagement might be high or low. CEOs can obtain glory, right now, from taking bold actions per se (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002) ; narcissists act accordingly, exerting themselves more when they think the audience is currently captivated.
Second, our audience engagement findings suggest that narcissistic CEOs are attuned, consciously or subconsciously, to how much audience engagement currently exists for a new technology overall (in our case, biotech). Following from our conceptualization and operationalization of audience engagement, our results suggest that narcissistic CEOs keep a running estimate of how exciting, provocative, and challenging a technology is seen to be by the public (or at least by prominent media outlets). Our results might have been even stronger if we had been able to gauge audience engagement with specific types of biotech initiatives. Nonetheless, modeling audience engagement at the level of the overall technology appears to be an appropriate, albeit incomplete way to think of the narcissistic CEO's motivational milieu.
CEO Narcissism and Managerial Attention
Beyond its influence on investments, we find that CEO narcissism also promotes managerial attention to a discontinuous technology. Moreover, just as with investments, we find that the association between CEO narcissism and Gerstner et al. 279 managerial attention is moderated by audience engagement. Thus it appears that the personal dispositions of business leaders become reflected in organizational cognitions and discourse in ways that have previously not been explored. Recent years have seen important advances in introducing a cognitive perspective to organizational studies (e.g., Ocasio, 1997; Kaplan, 2011) , including explanations of organizational adaptation to technological shifts (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008) . With limited exceptions, however (e.g., Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2012; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012) , researchers have not explored the determinants of managerial attention: Why do companies direct their scanning, analyses, debates, and discourse as they do? Our project suggests that CEOs' personalities provide a partial answer.
Our study fails to corroborate prior findings of an association between managerial attention and subsequent strategic actions (e.g., Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009 ). Yet, when we compared our results with those of Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson (2003) , who also studied pharma adoptions of biotech, we concluded that there may be an intriguing reason for these seemingly inconsistent results, hinging on the longer timespan of our investigation. As a working hypothesis, we wondered whether the link between attention and actions/outcomes is strongest in the early years of a new technology, when attention is relatively scarce, and can be genuinely construed as ''recognition'' or ''awareness'' (e.g., Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003) . Later on, as attention to the technology becomes pervasive and second nature, the link to actions might become weaker. For instance, one could imagine that retailers' attention to the Internet (as reflected in their letters to shareholders) in 1998, say, was far more predictive of their near-term e-retailing initiatives than would be the case a decade later. Finding support for this supposition would significantly contribute to the literature on discontinuous change, which so far has assumed a time-invariant relation between attention and adoption.
To explore this idea, we re-ran our analyses for various truncated time spans, and we found that when we limited the panel to just the first 20 years or so of biotech, the association between attention (in t-1) and investment (in t) became much stronger, in most cases significant, peaking at p < .02 for the 1980-1996 panel, which is almost exactly the timeframe of Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson's (2003) study. We show these results in the final four columns of the Appendix. As can be seen in model 5, CEO narcissism was positively associated with managerial attention during this initial 16-year period; and in model 6, we see that CEO narcissism was associated with biotech investments. In model 7, we see a significant positive association between managerial attention (in t-1) and biotech investments (in t), supporting H5a. Finally, in model 8, when both CEO narcissism and managerial attention are included, the magnitude of the coefficient for CEO narcissism declines appreciably and ceases to be significant, while the coefficient for managerial attention is basically unchanged and still significant, a pattern strongly suggesting mediation (per Baron and Kenny, 1986) , thus supporting H5b. Altogether, these additional findings motivate us to offer a post hoc proposition: the association between managerial attention and subsequent strategic actions, as well as the mediating effects of managerial attention, are stronger in the earlier phases of a phenomenon than in later phases. It is in the earlier days that attention equates with recognition or awareness of the emergent development; in the later days, attention may be highly institutionalized and pervasive.
CEO Narcissism and Company Adaptation
In showing that narcissistic CEOs may be a force in bringing about company responsiveness to technological shifts, our project stands in contrast to the typically negative portrayal of this personality dimension. In our conception, narcissism is a spur to risk taking and innovation; when others are timid, the narcissist acts on his or her supreme confidence and craving for applause. Other writers have discussed the potential benefits of narcissistic leaders, especially under dynamic conditions. For instance, Maccoby (2003: 10) said that ''narcissists are wired for periods of rapid and disruptive change.'' He also described narcissists as having a ''change the world'' personality.
Narcissists may be interpersonally annoying, and their self-centeredness may engender outright selfish behavior, but there is nothing in the narcissistic syndrome that is inherently insidious. Narcissists are not, per se, destructive or evil (Raskin, 1980) . To the extent that bold, quantum, and unconventional actions are needed to renew or save an organization, a narcissistic leader may be the best bet. Indeed, our findings in the context of biotech adoption represent an intriguing case of Kay's (2010) concept of ''obliquity,'' or the idea that organizations sometimes succeed by pursuing objectives that are only indirectly (and possibly even counterintuitively) related to performance. The narcissist is propelled to take risky and bold actions, in part, by his or her desire for attention; if the environment then shifts in the direction of the executive's actions, the company's performance is enhanced. In such a case, even though the narcissistic CEO is not motivated solely by performance outcomes, the effect ends up being beneficial.
Of course, a narcissist's actions can play out very differently. Just as narcissists are not inherently evil, so too are they not inherently smart or lucky (Goncalo, Flynn, and Kim, 2010) . Therefore the daring initiatives of narcissists will tend to bring about extreme outcomes (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) , but not necessarily good outcomes. Narcissists may deliver transformative breakthroughs, or they might deliver catastrophic disasters. In this regard, it is important to reiterate that biotech, the new technology we studied, ultimately proved to have merit, and the narcissistic CEOs who vigorously pursued it can be seen, in hindsight, as salutary. But it is just as easy to picture narcissistic CEOs who invest aggressively in technologies that do not pan out and who severely damage their companies as a result.
Future Research
Our project points to several additional research avenues, some of which derive from the study's own limitations. First, it would be very interesting to go beyond a firm's investments in a discontinuous technology to explore the firm's ultimate degree of success. Namely, does CEO narcissism aid in corporate adaptation and survival?
Second, and relatedly, there is a pressing opportunity to conduct our type of study in a situation in which a new technology proves to be a flop or is quickly superseded by yet another technology. If narcissistic CEOs are eager adopters Gerstner et al. 281 of new technologies, then this eagerness will manifest itself in less beneficial ways in cases in which the technology does not pan out (Guler, 2007) . Research on technological discontinuities overwhelmingly focuses on ''successful'' new technologies, often looking back, as we do, and asking why companies did not all embrace them more aggressively. But managers cannot know in advance which technologies will prevail; therefore researchers might greatly benefit from inverting their customary question, instead asking which companies overinvested in new technologies that were destined to fail, and why they did so. Third, our project introduces the concept of audience engagement, a potentially potent moderator of narcissistic impulses, yet begs follow-on questions: If narcissists are motivated by audience engagement with an overall technology (as we have shown), would audience engagement with specific types of actions (e.g., joint ventures with certain types of partners) yield even stronger predictions of narcissists' investments? What would be the effect if audience engagement were conceptualized (and operationalized) as recent applause (press or analyst raves) for CEOs specifically, rather than as audience captivation with the overall technology? Recognizing that a host of conceptual and measurement refinements are possible, we anticipate that the idea of audience engagement might be fruitful for any researchers who wish to consider the social context of decision making, especially those studying narcissism.
Fourth, it would be interesting to examine how narcissistic CEOs behave when faced with less glamorous or less attention-grabbing discontinuities, such as the rise of generic drugs in the pharma industry. Such mundane technologies might hold little attraction for narcissistic CEOs; the ''narcissism effect'' on the adoption of these technologies might be far less than we observed for the ''sexier'' biotech revolution.
Finally, it would be very informative to conduct qualitative research, especially using field methods, to observe the actual behaviors of more-and lessnarcissistic CEOs who are confronted with a technological discontinuity. How do they manifest their degree of narcissism in their tangible managerial behaviors? How do they influence others? How do narcissists' arguments concerning new technologies differ from those of non-narcissists? How do they treat managers or other employees who are steeped in the old technology? We can envision a host of interesting follow-on questions for researchers who are interested in managerial behavior and micro-processes. y Results are similar when control for endogeneity is added: control for endogeneity and managerial attention are both significant (both p < .05). This result is robust if the control for firm non-biotech acquisitions is added.
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